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The focus of this study is to build, from the ‘bottom-up’, a market with artificially 
intelligent adaptive agents based on the institutional arrangement of the Colombian 
Foreign Exchange Market (1994-1999) in order to determine simple agents’ design, 
rules and interactions that are sufficient to create interesting behaviours at the 
macroscopic level – emerging patterns that replicate the properties of the time series 
from the case study. 
 
Tools from artificial intelligence research, such as genetic algorithms and fuzzy logic, 
are the basis of the agents’ mental models, which in turn are used for forecasting, 
quoting and learning purposes in a double auction market. Sets of fuzzy logic rules yield 
adequate, approximately continuous risk and utility preferences without the need to fix 
their mathematical form ex-ante.  
 
Statistical properties of financial time series are generated by the artificial market, as 
well as some additional non-linearity linked to the existence of a crawling band. 
Moreover, the behaviour of the simulated exchange rate is consistent with currency 
band theory. 
Agent’s learning favours forecasting rules based on regulatory signals against rules 
based on fundamental information. Also, intra-day volatility is strongly linked to the 
rate of arrival and size of real sector trades. Intra-day volatility is also a function of the 
frequency of learning and search specialisation. It is found that when a moderately low 
frequency of learning is used, volatility increases. 
 
Key words: adaptive agents, artificial markets, constrained generating procedures, 
fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms. 
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In the last 20 years, agent-based models have increasingly commanded the attention of 
researchers in finance and economics. The possibility of integrating the co-adaptive 
behaviour of autonomous (intelligent) individuals with an analysis of macroeconomic 
patterns without the need to explicitly assume investors’ homogeneous expectations or 
positing the hypothesis that all markets for all future times exist today, as well as the 
opportunity to study the mechanisms whereby the economy or the market evolves over 
time in a controlled setting - a computational laboratory – makes it a compelling topic 
of research. It is an area of great interest not only for researchers, but also for investors 
and policymakers.  
 
The primary focus of this work is the construction, from the ‘bottom-up’, of a market 
with artificially-intelligent adaptive agents based on the institutional arrangement  – 
monetary policy, regulations and trading conventions – of the Colombian Foreign-
Exchange Market that prevailed between December 1994 and September 1999, period 
for which a currency bands mechanism was in place.  
 
There are two basic motives for using this particular case. First, the regulations and 
explicit monetary policy established by the Banco de la República (Central Bank) in 
terms of a monetary base corridor, an interest rate range and a currency band, combined 
with a transparent set of intervention rules in each of these markets, enables us to 
construct a complete model of the institutional environment that confronts the agents. 
Second, as a very complete data set was made available by the Central Bank, the 
possibility of studying agents’ daily net US-dollar positions, forward market contracts, 
Colombian Peso (COP) intra-day transactions, amounts traded, daily US-dollar real 
sector supply and demand, etc. offers insights into market micro-structure and market 
dynamics, and facilitated the study of emergent properties at the macro level.  
 
A subsidiary goal is to study the behaviour of this artificial market from the perspective 
of a policymaker since (Durlauf, 1997): (1.) interactions amongst agents can result in 
aggregate behaviour that may lead the system to undesired states; and (2.) the 
effectiveness (or consequences) of policies is linked to the nature of the interactions and 
interdependencies amongst agents. If, for example, positive feedbacks, asymmetric interactions, or “mass” thresholds exist and are reinforced, non-linear effects may 
influence the path followed by the system and make policy evaluation a difficult and 
complex task.  
 
The level of reality that is achieved by using the Colombian monetary and regulatory 
arrangements (including intervention procedures), together with feedback mechanisms 
in the agent’s expectations regarding price determination and quoting procedures, 
represents a novel approach to artificial market design. To date, given the lack of 
adequate daily economic data, artificial markets have operated under an assumed 
environment where fundamentals are supposed either to have a particular mathematical 
form (usually some autoregressive process) or to follow models drawn from economic 
theory.  
 
A two-step fuzzy-logic cognitive model for agent forecasting and quoting - which by 
means of a fuzzy rule-set and a set of membership functions - manages the agent’s 
inventory and risk without the need for an explicit ex-ante mathematical declaration of 
the agent’s utility function and risk aversion. This allows for better modelling of real 
traders characteristics from a symbolic (deductive) perspective without losing the 
advantage of numerical processing
2. 
 
The environmental constraints arising from the actual interactions between the financial 
agents with either the real sector (constructed from actual daily supply and demand 
data) or the Central Bank, which determine the “physical” constraints of the 
environment in which agents learn and adapt trough a Fuzzy Logic – Genetic Algorithm 
system (FLGA), combined with the positive feedbacks embedded between the exchange 
rate produced by the financial market and the modelled economic environment, adds a 
new dimension to the learning problem. In markets with artificial agents, the impact of 
the fundamentals manifests itself (directly or indirectly) through the performance 
measure, which is used in the learning process.  
 
In this artificial market, a broader approach is taken whereby traders perform actual 
trades with the Central Bank and real-sector agents, which directly affect their inventory 
                                                 
2 Below it is shown how fuzzy sets represent knowledge symbolically while transforming it numerically. and risk. A distinct form of dynamics arises as the timing, amount and rate at which 
these trades are performed, and the identity of the financial traders by whom they are 
actually performed, permanently affects the topology of the system and traders’ 
performance. This is a big step because, in order for evolutionary learning to perform 
adequately, the physical constraints on the agent’s actions must be well defined and in 
this market Central Bank and real-sector participation are continuously (at the intra-day 
level) constraining agents’ interactions and behaviour.   
2. The Functional Model 
 
We introduce the artificial market from a functional perspective. See Reveiz (2008) for 
the presentation of the general modelling framework based on Holland´s cgp’s (1995, 
1998).  
 
2.1. Basic Assumptions 
 
The main assumptions used in the implementation of the model are: 
  
1. Agents can have Heterogeneous Expectations. 
2. Information is discounted within relevant [individual] theoretical frameworks  
3. Agents can dynamically improve the models they are using (learning).    
4. Agents have internal mechanisms for computing the profit and risk associated 
with the transfers. 
5. Trade is a Profit-Improving bilateral barter between agents. 
6. Price formation is the result of actual trades and not the product of the 
intervention of the neoclassical so-called Auctioneer. 
7. The Quoting process is a function of the agent’s forecast, inventory, risk, 
spread, trading success and his or others’ last quotes. It is also a function of 
an estimation of market supply (SS) and demand (DD), Market’s Best 
Bid/Ask, Average Bid/Ask and Bid/Ask Spread. 
 
 
 2.2. The Belief Model 
 
An agent can be characterized by a belief set and a set of actions. The belief set includes 
the mental models, the learning mechanisms, a set of parameters and the fitness of the 
models, which determine which expectational model is actively used. Combining the 
belief set with the appropriate inputs, plausible actions are then taken by the trader. The 
belief set is summarised by a 7-tuple as follows: 
 
.   at time   agent  for  set  n  Informatio   : ,
. agent  for  ion  determinat   interval   learning for    freedom   of   Degrees   :
. agent  for  ion  determinat   interval   learning for    Delta   :
. agent  for    rate Mutation  :
. agent  for    rate ion  Recombinat   :
.   at time   agent  for    e performanc   sets   Rule   : ,
.   at time   agent  for    sets   Rule   : ,
.   at time   agent  for    Functions   Membership   ing correspond   and   Sets Fuzzy  : ,
.   at time   agent  for  Set    Belief   : ,
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The plausible actions are defined as a 4-tuple and action states are particular instances 
of this action (Quoting) set, i.e. whether the trader is in a {buying}, {selling} or {market 
making} state is implicitly determined by the quoting actions:  
. t   at time   i agent  for  set   n  Informatio                           : t , i
. t   at time   i agent  by  amount    Quote Ask    in the   Change      : AskAmount t , i
. t   at time   i agent  by    Quote Ask    in the   Change                    : Ask t , i
. t   at time   i agent  by  amount    Quote   Bid    the inf   Change       : BidAmount t , i
. t   at time   i agent  by    Quote   Bid   in the   Change                     : Bid t , i
actions   Plausible                             : A t , i
} t , i | AskAmount t , i , Ask , BidAmount t , i t , i
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In order to study the agent’s behaviour, we can modify his belief set either by changing 
the rate at which he learns (learning interval), the amount of exploration (mutation) or specialisation (recombination), and the initial possibilities he is given (by modifying the 
number of models the agent is given, we limit the rate at which he finds good solutions). 
The information available to each agent can also be modified. Varying the number of 
rules that make up a rule-set can also change the sophistication of the models used by 
the agent.  
 
2.3. The Goal Model 
 
The microscopic objective of each of the agents is simply to make profits by 
maximizing the performance of his/her expectational model. Clearly, each agent is 
confronted with a difficult maximization problem because the environment, which 
determines the fitness landscape for each model, is continuously changing. 
Consequently, a model that is successful under some conditions may perform poorly 
under other conditions. Moreover, as performance is an ex-post measure, it may very 
well be that the best model may not perform particularly well while it is active because 
of a change in environmental conditions. Such a situation can only be corrected in the 
next learning state (if conditions do not vary significantly again). Bear in mind that the 
environment includes all of the other agents’ strategies, which may vary more than the 
economic variables, thereby inducing more environmental volatility.   
2.4. The Trader’s mental model 
 
Following Lyons (2000) a hybrid approach to determine the trader’s next quote is used, 
in which exchange rate macroeconomics and market microstructure are linked and 
where a change in the nominal exchange rate is a function of the fundamentals f(i, m, z) 
– including current and past values of domestic and external interest rate (i), the money 
supply (m) and any other macro determinants, denoted by z -  and of some micro factors 
g(X, I, Z) including the order flows (X), the inventory (I) and other micro determinants, 
denoted by Z. 
 
ΔPt=f(i, m, z) +g(X, I, Z)+et 
 In order to implement this hybrid approach, forecasting and the consequent quoting are 
accomplished in two steps using a combination of two fuzzy systems. The first system 
creates a forecast by looking at the expected supply and demand in the market, the 
interest rate level, the position of the exchange rate within the exchange rate band, the 
level of international reserves and a set of moving-average calculations for the exchange 
rate. Given an expected behaviour for the market price, the trader decides how to 
modify his quotes. In order to do this, he/she must check other relevant variables.  
 
These come from two sources: market information and the trader’s private information. 
The first includes inter-alia: market spread, the best bid and ask rates in the market, an 
estimation of market demand/supply from other traders; while the second focuses 
mainly on risk exposure and inventory indicators.  
 
Rules for the forecasting function are constructed from the expected relationship 
between variables that arise from economic models. The complete set of rules represent 
the “fundamentals” of the economy in the sense that, if every trader is given the 
complete set of rules, they could in equilibrium conditions forecast accurately the 
behavior of the exchange rate: the efficient market hypothesis holds for this artificial 
market - under these conditions - if the full information set is given to each of the 
traders.  
 
If each trader is randomly given a rule-set that contains “good” and “bad” rules, or a 
limited number of rules, his forecasting model is not fully accurate and we should 
expect trades to arise (Arrow, 1987) as agents have distinct views on the market. In this 
context, learning can easily be incorporated by allowing traders to dynamically improve 
their models.  
 
This is done using a genetic algorithm. Each trader is given various rule-sets and, 
although forecasts are produced only with the fittest rule-set, all of them are ranked in 
terms of performance. Consequently, they are periodically used as a population for the 
genetic algorithm, which by recombination and mutation improves these rule-sets.  
 
 2.5. Central Bank Intervention 
 
Central Bank (CB) intervention is represented by a 3-tuple {Price, Amount, Action} 
where trade intention is determined by the action (bid or ask).  In the period under 
study, Banco de la República’s intervention in the foreign-exchange market was 
accomplished through two mechanisms that corresponded to the two objectives 
prevailing for the Colombian authorities: (i.) a currency band that provides the private 
sector with some degree of certainty and limits extreme trends; and (ii.) intra-marginal 
(dirty) intervention performed to lower intra-day daily volatility. Together with a 
monetary corridor and an interest rate range, these are the practical formalization of the 
CB objective function. 
 
The Currency Band was public knowledge as was used in the agent’s forecasting 
models. When exchange rate transactions reach either the top or the bottom of the 
currency band, the authorities sell or buy foreign currency in quoted amounts of 10,000 
units
3 at the band’s exchange rate for that specific day. For a detailed description of the 
issues related to the design, implications and effective and potential complexity of 
currency bands, the reader is referred to Brooks and Revéiz (2002). 
 
In the artificial market, marginal (inside the band) intervention is performed in batches 
of 250 units of foreign currency when the percentage change in the exchange rate 
exceeds the volatility range set by the authorities. When the exchange rate is close to the 
limits of the currency bands, the intra-marginal range converges to the currency band 
exchange rates. 
 
Boundaries   Band Currency    : CurrB
Range   marginal - Intra : IntraB
Rate   Exchange    the of   Level : FXCR
CurrB) IntraB, f(FXCR, Intt =
 
 
Although intervention rules are defined deterministically, the occurrence (and amount) 
of intervention cannot be forecasted because the specific moments when the boundaries 
                                                 
3 Traders’ quoted amounts range between zero and 1000 units. Partial trades are also allowed. are reached cannot be predicted since they depend on the traits of and the interactions 
amongst agents.  
2.6. Real Sector Participation 
 
Real Sector participation in the market is accomplished indirectly. The economic 
environment provides the daily supply and demand of dollars from the real sector which 
are derived from historical data. The amount that the real sector will sell to, and/or buy 
to and from the financial sector for each intra-day time step is allocated randomly. Then, 
at each of these intra-day time steps, the real sector calls a group of randomly-chosen 
financial institutions and trades with the trader who wins the “tournament”. This 
procedure is repeated as many times as necessary for amounts of 250 units
4 until the 
total supply and the total demand for that intra-day time step are traded
5.  
2.7. Market Mechanism Function 
 
The market mechanism is organized around three concepts: Trading Documents 
(Messages), the Order Book and the Board. Trading Documents identifies the trader, 
present his disposition to trade, the prices at which he/she would like to transact, as well 
as the quantities. The Order Book includes the messages, a time stamp, the time for 
which this quote is valid and a trader id-tag.   The Board displays the Trading 
Documents of all the traders, as well as the rate and the amount of the last trade that 
occurred in the market (similar to Colombia’s foreign-exchange Citiinfo market). 
Glosten (1994) has shown that an open and accurate book enhances market efficiency, 
in a theoretical framework. Moreover, a small bid/offer spread may appear. 
 
Following Miller (1996), messages can be represented as a 3-tuple {action,p,q}, where 
action gives the action to be taken {bid or ask}, p gives the price for the bid and q the 
quantity that corresponds to this price. For instance, the message {ask, 1000, 300} 
represents a market order to sell 300 units at a price of 1000. The order book is made up 
out of a set of orders – that change over time – and a set of rules – fixed over time – that 
determine how/when trades are consummated among two or more traders.  
                                                 
4 In the inter-bank market, traders can quote 100, 300, 500, 700 or 1000 units at any time.  
5 A balancing transaction for any remainder is also performed.  
The Order Book also includes a time-stamp and an id-tag
6, which together provide a 
unique “key” as to the intentions of each trader at every time step
7.  A trader can send 
messages to trade simultaneously on both sides of the market (Market Maker). 
 
By assuming that the sign of the amount quoted reflects the desired action 
(positive/negative for bid/ask respectively), the state of the order book can be 
represented by the collection of messages and their corresponding time stamps and id-
tags:  }] , , , { },..., , , , { }, , , , [{ 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 M M M M tag id t q p tag id t q p tag id t q p − − −  where M is the number 
of orders in the book.  
 
The set of rules in the Order Book constitutes a simplified double-auction market. 
Traders are able to post quantities from the set {100, 300, 500, 700, 1000}, and each 
order can be partially fulfilled. As mentioned above, traders submit messages, to buy 
and/or sell.  They can also accept posted bids or asks. A transaction occurs when the bid 
and ask are either equal or cross.  
 
This book cannot contain orders that can be sequentially executed in such a way that 
positive profits are earned for a zero net position (Miller, 1996). If this situation arises, 
the order in question is immediately filled with quotes that: (i.) meet the conditions in 
terms of price and intention; and (ii.) have the highest priority, as specified by the id-tag 
and time stamp “key”.  
 
It should be noted that the double auction achieves high efficiency in a variety of 
environments, that convergence occurs rapidly and has been the natural choice for most 
experimental studies (Williams and Smith, 1984; Chan et al, 1999). For more details on 
the double auction mechanism, the reader is referred to McCabe (1993) and Williams 
(1980). 
                                                 
6 Miller (1996) includes both the time of the message and the trader identification in the time stamp. For clarity, these 
will be treated separately in this section. 
7 This implies that for orders that arrive simultaneously, some mechanism is used to order them in time. In this case, 
the best quote is given precedence if two quotes arrive simultaneously. 3. Description of Experimental Setting and Preliminary Discussion 
 
Modifications to the parameters in the simulation permit the study of changes in market 
dynamics as the result of variations in micro-structural factors, either intrinsic to the 
object or the interactions, or macro-structural factors, such as the institutional and 
economic environment. An agent’s intrinsic micro-structural factors can be part of 
his/her “genetic traits”, such as risk aversion and capital, or can be related to the 
“cognitive model” such as learning frequency or forecasting model’s sophistication and 
complexity. Changes in the interactions are limited to variations in the auction 
mechanism and distinct quoting procedures (adaptive vs. non-adaptive quoting), 
although interactions respond indirectly to the co-adaptation and coupling of the 
learning processes through the performance measure. Macro-structural factors can be 
further divided into the drift, cyclic and shock parameters of the variables for that 
describe the economic factors and into regulatory requirements, public monetary policy 
mechanisms (FX band, monetary corridor and interest-rate range) and specific intra-
marginal intervention rules such as the maximum targeted volatility and the maximum 
intervention amount (intra-marginal) for any given day. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these 
macro-structural and micro-structural factors, respectively. The description of each 
specific variable or factor appears in the second column (Variables) in the diagrams. 
Factors have been indexed with letters and numbers. For instance, B2 refers to 
parameters that affect the way the authorities perform their intra-marginal intervention: 
greater dispersion would result in lower Central Bank activity in the market when the 
exchange-rate is away from the limits of its band and the maximum amount allowed for 
a given day limits the impact of the authorities in the market in order to avoid affecting 
the general trend (as posited by the objectives of the Colombian Authorities). In 
discussing the experiments, this structure will be maintained. Each parameter is 
described below. Figure 1. Macro-structural Simulation Factors 
 
The economic environment (A) is modelled with a set of stochastic differential 
equations where the deterministic part is composed of drift and cyclical components and 
stochastic behaviour is generated with a combination of Brownian and Poisson diffusion 
processes to capture volatility and non-normal behaviour (jumps). Modifications to the cyclic factors must be handled carefully as different processes - e.g. the interest-rate and 
the monetary base – are correlated as implicitly captured by the genetic algorithm fit, 
mainly in the phase factor. This is also the case for the volatility and jump-diffusion 
parameters because economic variables may share the same sources of uncertainty. In 
macroscopic terms, although modification of the economic parameters may yield 
interesting results, the scope of the simulations was limited to a study of the impact of 
the institutional (B) factors. Simulations replicate the Colombian (historical) case, using 
either the observed data or the fitted parameters.  
 
The analysis of changes to the institutional environment (B) is of the utmost importance 
in emerging countries, and in the Colombian case in particular, because regulatory 
changes occur often and an understanding of the potential consequences of these 
changes can increase the effectiveness of policy implementation (from the authorities’ 
perspective) or provide significant returns to investors.  For example, we could ask what 
would happen if short net positions were allowed in the FX market or if the band’s 
width were to be decreased. 
 
In accordance with complexity theory, microscopic factors are approached from the 
perspective of the interactions between the objects (D), and the objects (C) themselves, 
see figure 1 above. First, “genetic” fixed traits (C1) can be modified
8, resulting in 
changes in the market’s topology. Second, agent’s exploration or specialization in terms 
of choice of cognitive alternatives (models) can be modified with the recombination and 
mutation parameters of the GA.  
 
Moreover, exploration or specialization in a given environment is a function of the 
number of generations that the GA runs for every call to the learning mechanism, and 
the frequency of this call (C2). For instance, if the number of generations is high for 
every call, the algorithm will repeatedly recombine from a limited pool of rules, 
containing the active rule-set plus the other rule-sets evaluated by the agents in the 
Fuzzy Logic Genetic Algorithm (defined by the parameter Number of Rules Evaluated 
for GA Learning).  
 
                                                 
8 They remain fixed for the whole simulation. Figure 2. Micro-structural Simulation Factors 
 
 
This results in an over-specialization of the cognitive model for the specific conditions 
prevailing in the market, so that if, say, the exchange rate was near the upper limit of its 
band, rules relevant for this condition will be favored by the GA, and when the 
exchange rate moves away from its band, the agent’s model may be inadequate for the 
new conditions and the agent’s relative fitness will decrease (factor D1). This 
phenomenon will also occur if the GA is called too frequently although this will 
partially be offset by the fact that every call occurs under distinct environments.  
 
The sophistication of any “cognitive” model is linked to the number of rules that make 
up a rule-set. When traders are allowed to choose rules (including erroneous rules) from 
the whole universe of discourse, the level of sophistication will be a function of the combination of the number of right and wrong rules and the mechanism of aggregation 
of the Fuzzy Logic system.  
 
Therefore, when erroneous rules are included in the alternatives available to the agent, 
co-adaptation of fitness landscapes (comparative fitness of the agent’s models) becomes 
volatile as a single erroneous rule may sharply decrease an agent’s performance in a 
given environment, leading in turn to modification of most of the rules in the rule-set 
even though they may be adequate in most of the environments. The same applies to the 
absence of a given rule (or subset of rules) in a very specific environment, e.g. missing 
the proper rule near the limits of the band.  
 
Auctions mechanism (D3) are defined in exactly the way the Citiinfo
9 information 
trading system worked in Colombia during the period under study whereas distinct 
quoting mechanisms (D2) were explored mainly during the calibration of the model. 
Trading amounts allowed are also taken from the Colombian market conventions.  
 
Given the intrinsic computational power limitations to agent-based modelling, two sets 
of simulation exercises were conducted. In the first one (set 1), the market ran from 900 
days to 1750 days with 15 to 30 intra-day transactions (5 experiments), while in the 
second one (set 2) 150 days and 100 transactions, respectively, were used (3 
experiments). In the former, the focus is on long-term (emergent) behaviour whereas in 
the latter, shorter-term properties are studied. Statistical results and the observed 
emergent properties are robust across all simulations. Table 1 lists the parameters or the 
range of values used for the simulations.  
 
Table 1 - Simulation parameter ranges 
Variable Range 
Limits US Dollar Positions (USP)  USP∈ [0,0.2*Capital] or 
USP ∈ [-0.2*Capital, 0.2*Capital] 
FX Band Drift (FX_D)  FX_D= 15% all runs 
FX Band Width (FX_W)  FX_W= ± 7% all runs 
FX Band Central Parity (FX_CP)  FX_CP=  Mid-Point  or 
                                                 
9 Foreign Exchange trading system.  Variable Range 
FX_CP∈[MinBand,MaxBand] 
Allowed Daily Dispersion (ADD, Intra. Int.)  ADD ∈ {0.5%, 0.8%, 1%} 
Capital (CAP)  CAP ∈ [0-USD100,000,000] 
Risk Limits (VAR)  VaR ∈ [0,10%] depending on horizon 
Inventory Limits (INV)  INV ∈ [-0.2*Capital, 0.2*Capital] 
Frequency of Learning (FLG)  FLG ∈ [1,30] 
Number of Rulesets evaluated for GA 
Learning (NRE) 
NRE= 10 all runs 
Number of Rules that make up a Ruleset 
(NRC) 
NRC ∈ {30, 40, 50} 
Recombination Rate (XR)  XR ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8} 
Mutation Rate (MR)  MR ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} 
Number of Generations for GA Learning 
(NG) 
NG ∈ {7, 10, 20} 
Trading Amounts Banks (TAB)  TAB= {100, 300, 500, 700, 1000 }  all 
runs 
Trading Amounts Real Sector (TAR)  TAR= 250 all runs 
Trading Amounts Central Bank (TAC)  TAC= 250 all runs 
Maximum Intraday Intervention CB (AMC)  AMC ∈ {10000, 25000} 
 
The results obtained are presented in the next section. The analysis is divided into 
statistical properties, emergent patterns and learning evolution for a long-term set, and 
into statistical properties and learning evolution for a short-term set. 
 4. Artificial Market Simulations 
4.1. Set 1: Long-term behaviour analysis  
4.1.1. Statistical Properties 
 
Figure 3 shows a sample of the (daily) returns series obtained for the long-term runs.   
 
Figure 3 - Returns (Set 1) 












Statistical analysis show that the series has a small trend and is leptokurtic - see Table 2. 
The histogram plot presented in Figure 4 supports this. As with the Colombian peso 
average returns, some autocorrelation is present. It is partially the result of the 
exchange-rate sticking to the band limits
10 but it also seems to be caused by the 
concentration of the real-sector supply and demand in only a few transactions as only 






                                                 
10 As no realignment occurred, the exchange rate from the simulations stays near the band limits more time that the 
actual exchange rate from the Colombian market. Table 2 - Moments for Set 1 Sample 
Mean    Median    Standard 
Deviation  
 Variance    Skewness    Kurtosis  
 0.0003528    .00041063    0.0011167    1.247e-006    -0.25869    4.9996  
 
Gaussianity is rejected by the Hinich test. Also, the normality plot presented in Figure 4 
shows that returns are not Normal. These findings are supported by the Normal 
Gaussianity test. Also, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favor of a 
stationary alternative.   
 
Figure 4 - Histogram and Normality plot for Returns (Set 1) 
 
More interestingly, the ARCH test supports the hypothesis of ARCH effects for the 
returns series. This hypothesis is also supported by the Ljung-Box test on the squared-
returns autocorrelation. Moreover, when the BDS test is applied to the estimated 
residuals of a GARCH(1,1) model, the null hypothesis is rejected as some further 
degree of non-linearity seems to be present in the returns series.  
 
Additional study of non-linearity shows that the correlation dimension converges when 
the embedded dimension reaches a high value of 15 – see figure 5. The white noise test 
supports the hypothesis of deterministic chaos.  
 
The Lyapunov spectrum shows that the movement is unstable while the momentary 
largest Lyapunov spectrum is inconclusive. Thus, like other artificial market “agent-based” models, the market gives rise to time series with leptokurtic returns and 
heteroscedasticity. It also exhibits other sources of non-linearity although its form 
cannot be determined and deterministic chaos cannot be rejected.  
 
Figure 5 - Correlation Dimension for Returns (Set 1) 











Embedded Dimension  
 
As shown in Figure 6, the complexity of the system, as measured by the pointwise 
correlation dimension, varies significantly. This is to be expected in a system of 
autonomous agents as their mutually reinforcing behaviors yield a geometry-dynamics 
duality.  
 
Figure 6 - Pointwise Correlation Dimension for Returns (Set 1) 









4.2.1.2. Emergent Patterns 
 
As with the actual Colombian peso, although not explicitly encoded, a small trend 
emerges from the agent’s interactions – see Table 6 above. We now turn our attention to the emergent patterns that the artificial market was able to replicate. It must be stressed 
that these behaviours arise while the market evolves: they are not encoded in the 
program. Only the mere possibility of their existence is allowed. For example, the 
definition of the currency band by the authorities does not ensure that the exchange rate 
will not cross this threshold. There is no specific rule that forbids agents from trading 
over this limit or compels them to modify their signal. Central Bank intervention, 
through actual sales or purchases, must “protect” these limits.  
 
If the intervention is successful, in time agents should include adequate rules in their 
ruleset. In this context, an event such as “exchange rate not overshooting the bands” 
would be an emergent property of the system. In terms of the currency bands, for the 
data series from set 1, around 7.7% of the trades occur slightly over the limits
11 with an 
average absolute deviation of 0.024% and a maximum absolute deviation of 0.155% of 
the mid-band – see Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 - Deviations from Currency Bands (Set 1) 













Deviations from Currency Band Limits  
 
Intervention by the Central Bank, implemented through actual trading with market 
participants, limits the trend in the market and successfully “defends” the limits 
stipulated by the authorities. Currency realignment, although possible, does not occur. 
From it to happen, the international reserves would have to fall by more than 500 
million dollars in less than 90 days. Also, mimetic contagion, which could trigger it, 
                                                 
11  In order for the Central Bank to quote in the market, the market rate must exceed the band limit in the previous 
time step. may occur if reserves exceed a given threshold and traders prefer to buy foreign 
currency
12. In this situation, however, the only seller will be the authorities and, as we 
mentioned before, only 15 transactions are allowed. As a result, the rate of decrease of 
the reserves will not be high enough with an average daily intervention of around 
US$4.9 million
13, including intra-day intervention. For this reason, the exchange rate 
tends to remain more time pegged to the upper limit than the observed data. The U-
shaped curve for the histogram of deviations, consistent with currency bands theory, is 
observed – see Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 - Deviations from Central Parity (Set 1) 













Exchange-rate volatility increases in the centre of the band, as the rate changes rapidly 
and decreases near the limits as expected by currency bands theory. Table 3 lists the 
standard deviation, the average returns and the time spent in each of the regimes 
defined. For these regimes, the currency band is divided into four intervals of equal 
size: the intervals that include the limits are defined as regime 1 and 3 (top and bottom, 




                                                 
12 In a currency crisis in an emergent country, traders carefully follow the level of the international reserves and a 
threshold - either to determine when to take or reverse a position - is usually determined implicitly by participants in the 
inter-bank market. In the Colombian currency crisis in 1998, a level of reserves of US$7.5 billion seems to have 
triggered many attacks to the upper band.  
13 The average amount on the days when intervention occurs. Table 3. Moments for Set 1 Sample 
Set 1  Standard Deviation  Daily Average Returns  Time Spent 
Regime1 0.0933%  0.0492%  39.26% 
Regime2 0.1576%  0.0427%  33.94% 
Regime3 0.1161%  0.0211%  26.80% 
 
When the intra-day dispersion allowed by the Central Bank is decreased from 1% to 
0.8%, intra-marginal intervention increases slightly, as well as local volatility – more 
trend reversals occur at the local level although overall volatility is decreased. As 
Central Bank intra-marginal intervention is generally small, increasing the maximum 
allowed daily amount of intervention does not change the results of the simulation. 
 
A decrease in the currency band width results in an increase in overall Central Bank 
intervention but exchange-rate behaviour does not change significantly in terms of its 
statistical properties, such as mean return, volatility or time spent in each regime. 
Interestingly, allowing traders to take short positions (up to 20% of their capital) does 
not significantly affect the market’s trend towards the upper limit of the band although 
reversals are more pronounced – cyclic behaviour has higher amplitude. 
 
An additional, and surprising, emergent property is that, during the learning process (see 
below), artificial agents include into their rule-sets (and retain) rules that refer to the 
level of international reserves, just as traders in the Colombian market did during the 




The results of our simulations enable us to assert that a general pattern arises when the 
artificial agents try to improve their rule-sets. In time, the importance of rules related to 
fundamentals diminishes, with the exception of the level of the international reserves. 
Rules that refer to the US dollar supply and demand are gradually discarded from the 
pool of rules, while agents keep around 10% of rules that refer to the net supply and 
demand.  
 
                                                 
14  For the analysis of evolutionary learning, agents draw rules only from the pool of correct rules. The role of fundamental rules is conditioned on the position of the exchange rate within 
its currency band. For instance, when the exchange rate is near one of its limits, 
fundamental rules are unsuccessful. Since the market rate stays near the limits almost 
70% of the time, rules referring to fundamental information are not favoured.  
 
In addition, because no realignment occurs in the simulations, the exchange rate spends 
more time in regimes 1 and 3 and this may bias agents’ learning against economic rules. 
Hence, in accordance with currency bands theory, additional factors are included in the 
process whereby agents form their expectations. In this artificial market context, these 
can either be technical or regulatory factors.  
   
In the long-term simulations, rules based on information about exchange-rate moving 
averages (technical signals) are eliminated while rules related to regulatory factors, such 
as the distance to the limits of the band, are incorporated. Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the 
results of the learning process for the longest simulation of 1750 market days.  
 
In the first 500 days, the importance of economic rules increases because the simulated 
exchange rate is set equal to the mid-point of the currency band and the rate stays 
mostly in regime 2. Thus, as expected, while the exchange rate is far from the limits, the 
GA favours fundamental factors.  Interestingly, during this period technical trading also 
increases – participation goes from 5.5% to 9%. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
this occurs because profitable trend-following strategies only arise away from the bands.  
 
Table 4. Average Rules Participation in Agents’ rulesets by Type of Rule Evolution 
Set 1  Fundamentals  Regulation  Technical 
250 Days  49.19%  45.34%  5.47% 
500 Days  55.84%  35.09%  9.07% 
750 Days  52.03%  41.90%  6.08% 
1000 Days  44.97%  52.82%  2.21% 
1750 Days  41.73%  57.32%  0.96% 
 
After 750 days, when the exchange rate hits the top of its band (regime 1), the weight of 
the regulatory rules in the agents’ cognitive model increases from 35% to 42%, while 
the use of fundamental and technical signals decreases from 56% to 52% and from 9% 
to 6% respectively. The importance of the level of the reserves increases sharply from 
17.8% to 21.6% - see Table 5-6.  
Table 5. Average Rules Participation in Agents’ rulesets by Signal  
Set 1  USD SSUSD DD Domestic Int. RateFX MANet SS/DD FXTop FXBot Reserves
250 Days  5.85%  5.90%  5.49%  5.47% 9.86%  24.34% 21.00% 22.09%
500 Days  9.38%  9.26%  8.89%  9.07% 10.45%  19.33% 15.76% 17.85%
750 Days  6.34%  6.47%  6.76%  6.08% 10.81%  21.60% 20.29% 21.65%
1000 Days  3.03%  2.56%  2.43%  2.21% 10.33%  25.80% 27.02% 26.63%
1750 Days  0.97%  0.82%  0.96%  0.96% 10.87%  28.77% 28.55% 28.10%
 
This trend is maintained until the end of the simulation, with international reserves 
accounting for most of the fundamental rules’ participation. Most traders eliminate 
technical trading rules and the learning algorithm favours regulatory rules.  
 
Dispersion amongst agents’ rule-sets is relatively small, and it decreases for the 
economic-based and technical-analysis-related rules. In terms of the regulatory-based 
rules, dispersion amongst agents’ choices of rules fluctuates. Moreover, the standard 
deviation of the rules related to environment regulatory and to international reserves – 
information that seems to be critical in a currency crisis environment - is several orders 
of magnitude higher.  
 
Table 6. Standard Deviation of Agents’ rulesets by Signal  
Set 1  USD SS USD DD Dom. Int. Rate FX MA Net SS/DD FX Top  FX Bot Reserves
250 Days  0.0221% 0.0216%  0.0247%  0.0182% 0.0579%  0.5628% 0.4923%0.3229%
500 Days  0.0364% 0.0335%  0.0365%  0.0388% 0.1843%  1.1172% 1.1542%0.9446%
750 Days  0.0316% 0.0239%  0.0325%  0.0221% 0.0795%  0.2231% 0.5534%0.4339%
1000 Days 0.0025% 0.0019%  0.0018%  0.0020% 0.0199%  0.1661% 0.1988%0.1031%
1750  Days 0.0018% 0.0029%  0.0024%  0.0022% 0.0732%  0.8687% 1.1629%1.4034%
 
On the other hand, evolutionary learning and its repercussions for market dynamics was 
moderately dependant on recombination and mutation parameters in terms of the rule-
set choice made by agents when rules were chosen from the fundamental set of rules - 
for parameter range used. Volatility and heteroscedasticity, although favoured by a low 
rate of mutation (around 5%) and relatively high rate of recombination (around 65%), is 
more affected by the frequency of learning and the number of generations used by the 
GA in every call to the algorithm. Representative values of these parameters are a 
moderately high frequency of learning - 5 to 10 days - and between 5 and 7 generations 
for every GA call.   
If the learning mechanism is invoked every day with a moderately high number of 
generations, volatility decreases as agents change their models too often and have no 
means of validating their rule-sets. On the other hand, if the learning algorithm is called 
infrequently, initially agents increase their inventory rapidly with a consequent increase 
in traded volume. Then, once the inventory and risk limits are reached, traded volume 
decreases and transactions are settled instead with the real sector, as in the 
homogeneous expectations case.   
In contrast to the Santa Fe artificial market (Arthur et al. 1997) - where volatility arises 
from the vast number of possible models
15 from which agents can choose - variability in 
this market is created by the parallel association between the agents’ rules and the entire 
ruleset with the environment (including other agents’ rule-sets).  
 
For a given rule-set that the agent may have at any given time step, his success is not 
only dependant on the intrinsic properties of his set of rules but also is conditioned upon 
the generating conditions – the physical environment (position in the currency band, 
economic trends) and the propensities created through feedback between the agents’ 
rule-sets and the constraining physical environment (currency bands, real-sector 
participation, etc) prevailing at that particular point in time. This in turn is a function of 
the correlation amongst rule-sets. 
4.2.2. Set 2: Short-term behaviour analysis  
 
Interestingly, some statistical properties of the simulated exchange rate and some 
features of the agents’ behavior differ from the results presented in the previous section 
for the long-term runs. For example, the arrival of real sector trades in 100 transactions 
every day (versus around 10 in the long-term runs) seems to increase the frequency of 
trend reversals and the exchange rate spends less time near the limits of its bands. The 
statistical properties and learning behavior of the agents are presented in the following 
sections.  
 
For comparative purposes, for the 100 intra-day transactions, returns every 10 
transactions were computed for running the tests. This allows us to check if the market 
                                                 
15 Those arise from the multiplicity of signals that, through the Classifier system mechanism, gives the agents countless 
possibilities.  is generating different patterns when running with more or less intra-day transactions or 
if its behavior is just similar and the timing and amount of real-sector and Central Bank 
intervention does not affect market dynamics. 
4.2.2.1. Statistical Properties 
 
Table 7 lists the moments of returns for the time series obtained from a sample 
simulation from Set 2. The histogram and the Normality plots in Figure 9 show that 
returns are leptokurtic and have fat tails. 
Table 7.  Moments of Returns (Set 2) 
 Mean    Median    Standard 
Deviation  
 Variance    Skewness    Kurtosis  
 4.699e-005    5.9332e-005    0.00073495   5.4015e-
007  
 -1.3354    34.8272  
 
The standard deviation is slightly smaller and kurtosis is significantly higher than the 
values obtained from Set 1.  
 
Figure 9. Simulated Returns Histogram and Probability Plot (Set 2) 
 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the simulated exchange rate and the amounts traded during the 
simulation. The Hurst Exponent of 0.468 supports the null hypothesis of a mean-
reverting process as in the case of the COP. The amount traded varies significantly and 
from the plot we see that market reversals are linked to sharp changes, generally 
increases, in traded volume. The exchange rate started at the mid-point of its band and during this period (150 days) never touched the limits although the Central Bank 
intervened intra-marginally on 22 days with, on average, less than 1% of the average 
amount traded daily in the market. 
 
Figure 10 - Simulated Rate and Amount Traded (Set 2) 







Simulated Rate (10 Transactions Intervals)







4 Amount Traded (10 Transactions Intervals)
 
Figure 11 shows the returns generated by the simulation: 
 
Figure 11 - Simulated Rate and Amount Traded (Set 2) 






-3 Generated Returns - 10 Transactions Intervals (Set 2)
 
 
On day 50 (500 transactions), an external shock of excess demand of US$90 million 
initially stops the market (no amount traded) and then generates a pronounced trend 
reversal, which is followed by a fall in the exchange rate as many traders violate their inventory and risk limits. Approximately 15% of the total Central Bank intervention is 
executed in those seven days. Gaussianity is rejected for the returns series when the 
Hinich test is applied. The bi-spectrum plot and the Gaussianity test support this result. 
The former is shown in Figure 12. The unit-root hypothesis is rejected at the 1% 
significance level. 
 
Figure 12 - Bi-spectrum Plot (Set 2) 
 
Squared returns differ statistically from zero for all lags tested using the Ljung-Box 
statistic. There is strong evidence for the presence of ARCH effects in the residuals of 
the linear model for the returns series. The null hypothesis is rejected when the BDS test 
is applied to the residuals of a GARCH(1,1). As with the COP hourly returns, rejection 
is less strong for intra-day returns than for daily returns.  
 
Unlike the previous exercise, non-linearity tests yield a non-converging correlation 
dimension – see Figure 13. This is supported by the white-noise test. The biggest 
Lyapunov exponent from the Lyapunov spectrum is mainly positive for various 
combinations of embedded dimension, number of neighbours and polynomes. On the 
other hand, the momentary largest Lyapunov exponent does not have a definite bias. 
Again, although evidence against deterministic chaos is important (correlation 
dimension, momentary largest Lyapunov Exponent and white-noise Test), it cannot be 
rejected with confidence. Complexity, as measured by the Pointwise Correlation Dimension, is high mostly when 
the demand shock occurs. As in the case of the long-run simulations, the market with 
artificial agents generates a time series with leptokurtic returns, fat tails and 
autoregressive heteroscedasticity. 
 
Figure 13 - Correlation Dimension (Set 2) 







Correlation Dimension (Set 2)
Embedded Dimension  
 
Increased frequency of market trend changes – local volatility - seems to be linked to 
the fact that US Dollar flows arrive in batches. Also, there is evidence of non-linearity 
although the exchange rate never actually reaches the limits of its currency band. This 
result is consistent with currency bands theory as agents include in their expectations 
the possibility of central bank intervention.  
 
In the next section, we show that in this set of exercises, agents increasingly include 
regulatory-related rules in their rule-sets although the limits are never reached.   
4.2.1.2. Evolutionary Learning 
 
As Table 8 shows, in this set of experiments the weights given to fundamental rules and 
the ones related with regulatory rules vary more, although there is a general tendency 




 Table 8. Average Rules Participation in Agents’ rulesets by Type of Rule Evolution 
(Set 2) 
Set 2  Fundamentals  Regulation  Technical 
0 Days  65.758%  19.883%  14.359% 
25 Days  64.706%  22.287%  13.006% 
75 Days  58.168%  31.781%  10.051% 
100 Days  55.106%  35.828%  9.067% 
125 Days  55.763%  35.161%  9.076% 
150 Days  57.568%  33.494%  8.938% 
 
Analysis of the specific signals shows that the weight given to each of the fundamental 
related signals, except International Reserves, decreases rapidly
16. The weight given to 
the level of the reserves increases from 9% to 17%. Similar increases occur for the 
variables related to monetary regulation.    
 
Table 9. Average Rules Participation in Agents’ rulesets by Signal 
Set 2  USD Supply USD DemandDom. Int. Rate FXMA Net SS/DD  FXTop  FXBot Reserves
0 Days  14.930%  14.686%  14.002%  14.359% 12.999%  9.533% 10.350% 9.141%
25 Days  13.127%  13.076%  12.379%  13.006% 12.460%  10.912% 11.376%13.665%
75 Days  10.854%  10.723%  10.678%  10.051% 9.588%  12.050% 19.730%16.327%
100 Days  9.762%  9.869%  9.644%  9.067% 10.647%  15.458% 20.369%15.183%
125 Days  9.959%  9.761%  9.621%  9.076% 11.554%  15.718% 19.443%14.868%
150 Days  9.853%  9.564%  9.352%  8.938% 11.431%  15.961% 17.533%17.368%
 
The variance of the weights given to each of these three variables is greater to the 
dispersion of the importance given to the other signals. Agents seem to carry a similar 
proportion of fundamental rules while more dispersion arises with signals related to 
regulation and international reserves.   
 
Table 10. Standard Deviation of  Agents’ rulesets by Signal 
Variance USD Supply USD DemandDom. Int. Rate FXMA Net SS/DD FXTop FXBot Reserves
0 Days  0.156%  0.138%  0.134%  0.123% 0.330%  1.346% 1.525% 1.272%
25 Days  0.101%  0.088%  0.089%  0.100% 0.441%  1.550% 1.669% 1.346%
75 Days  0.051%  0.040%  0.073%  0.040% 0.486%  1.480% 1.374% 1.031%
100 Days  0.025%  0.026%  0.050%  0.030% 0.415%  0.805% 1.286% 1.325%
125 Days  0.052%  0.052%  0.060%  0.056% 0.397%  1.223% 1.496% 1.097%
150 Days  0.048%  0.049%  0.054%  0.074% 0.256%  0.845% 1.066% 1.061%
 
This phenomenon can readily be seen in Figure 14. Rules 6, 7 and 8 are the distance to 
the top of the band, the distance to the bottom of the band, and the level of international 
reserves, respectively. Observe that as the days elapse, the surface flattens for indicators 
                                                 
16 Agents learn in average every 5 to 10 days. 1 to 5. Dispersion for indicators 6 to 8 decreases slightly but clearly agents seem to have 
heterogeneous views regarding the importance of regulatory rules – some give more 
weight to the distance to the top while others give more weight to the distance to the 
bottom. The disagreement is more significant for the distance to the top of the band and 
the level of reserves.  
 




The dynamics of learning are well illustrated in these plots as agents permanently 
change the weights given to each signal but co-adaptation seems to keep them relatively 
close. The ‘red queen’ effect yields some evolutionary coupling.  The fast rate at which 
rule-sets are modified is also apparent in the plots.  
4.3. Methodological Discussion 
 
Figure 15 below summarizes the methodological conclusions that are addressed in this 
section. As a first step, the discussion of the cognitive model – forecasting, quoting and 
learning – will be approached from the perspectives of the object (E1, E2 and E3 in the figure above) and the interactions (F1, F2). The forecasting model is able to generate 
heterogeneous forecasts through the various outputs created from the parallel 
association of distinct rules in the different rule-sets. This is an advantage of the 
forecasting subsystem as novel behaviour may arise when a few rules are changed in a 
rule-set in a given environment. 
 Figure 15 - Summary of Methodological Conclusions 
 
 
 In addition, although the system is sensitive to changes in the relationship between 
rulesets and environment, it still retains the averaging properties of fuzzy-logic 
weighted aggregation and de-fuzzification which provide an approximately continuous 
space for the relationships between inputs and outputs at each time step.  
 
An increase in input signals in the forecasting mechanism seems to result in increased 
exchange rate volatility but it is very expensive in terms of computational power. With 
the set of 9 inputs/outputs used in most of the simulations (and their respective 
membership functions), around 750,000 rules can be constructed overall. The addition 
of just one input with three membership functions would increase the number of 
possible rules to more than 2 million. When more rules are included in an agent’s rule 
set, the GA approximates better the correct rule-set – i.e. the set that includes the rules 
taken from economic models and the appropriate regulatory rules. Marginal 
improvement, however, decreases when more than around 35% of the rules are given to 
the trader. In fact, because environmental conditions are continuously changing, the GA 
tends to find a rule-set that “on average” performs well or that adapts well to the 
prevailing environment when conditions do not vary rapidly.  
 
When the entire simulation is run, the number of rules that make up a rule-set radically 
affects computational complexity. For this reason, and bearing in mind that each agent 
continually evaluates in parallel 10 distinct rule-sets (for GA performance measures), 
the number of rules is limited to the set {30, 40, 50} for the simulations. This is a form 
of incomplete or asymmetric information but where favoured or affected traders are not 
defined ex-ante (informed vs. uninformed) and their status is co-dependent on the 
environmental constraints prevailing at each time step. This forces the GA algorithm to 
specialize in order to find the adequate set of rules for the current environment.  
 
Like real traders, artificial agents have to select from amongst the various alternative 
models. It is not a question of finding the “correct” model but of identifying the 
appropriate model for a given context; and switching to another model rapidly when the 
situation changes. It is this search that generates higher volatility when rules are drawn 
from the correct or accepted set of rules only. It also accounts for the lower volatility 
that arises when rules are drawn from the whole universe of discourse (including 
erroneous rules) as it has a similar impact to greatly increasing the mutation rate, which in turn polarizes the market to the point where half the market is bearish and the other 
half is bullish
17 if the market is initialised by giving each trader a ruleset chosen 
randomly from the whole universe of discourse. Allowing traders to draw rules from the 
correct pool of rules is the best methodological choice because it is clear that an 
investor who also learns deductively would not use erroneous, illogical rules.  
 
A great advantage of using a fuzzy logic system is that it allows the researcher 
implicitly to supply the agents with a set of rules that are deductively and rationally 
chosen and ensures that the heterogeneity generated in the market does not arise from 
the use of erroneous models (that human traders would never use anyway).  
 
GA convergence improves significantly when a factor that measures how well the 
ruleset is forecasting compared to the “fundamental” rule set – the distance to the 
fundamentals – is included in the performance measure. Although its weight is less than 
1/3 of the total indicator, it results in an increase in traded volume and an increase in 
volatility and heteroscedasticity. It seems that a small attractor is needed in the 
formation of expectations – just as banks modify their expectations (models) when new 
information arrives – which increases the level of co-adaptation between rule-sets. 
Some coherence is needed amongst agents at the microscopic level of the models (rule-
sets) for volatility to emerge – this reminds us of Prigogine’s (1998) requirement for 
coherence at the microscopic level for non-equilibrium to exist.        
 
An adequate quoting process that at the same time manages inventory and risk 
exposures has been achieved.  The inclusion of feedbacks in the quoting system through 
indicators that refer to best market quotes, average market quotes, bid/ask spreads, 
market intention and the agent’s own information (his spread, inventory and risk) 
provide the basis for market dynamics in a setting similar to the way a trader actually 
works. Again, deductive logic is implicitly (partially) included through the symbolic 
interface of fuzzy logic systems. Moreover, it yields an approximately continuous set of 
functions for the risk and expected return of the trader that are constructed from the 
quoting rule set. 
                                                 
17 The number of erroneous rules is much greater than the number of correct rules.  References 
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